Brian supposes the following scenario: Bob bets the barman that Frank is too drunk to know where his car is. Frank heads out to where he usually parked his car, forgetting that today he parked it in a different place. Unbeknownst to anyone, some joyriders stole Frank's car from where he parked it, and left it where he usually parked it. Frank takes them to the place he usually parks, and there is the car; therefor, according to Brian, the barman ought to win the bet. I.e. although Frank's belief about where his car was was completely unjustified, it turned out to have been true, so we ought to say that Frank knew where his car was.
Suppose, instead, that although Frank usually parks on Elm Street, today he is so drunk that he heads in the opposite direction, towards Main Street, thinking that he's heading towards Elm. When they get to Main Street, the joyriders have left the car there. "Here it is, right on Elm where I left it, " announces Frank. So, it would seem that according to Brian's argument, Frank knew where his car was...although even after finding the car, Frank still doesn't know where he is. Ought Bob still pay the barman?
I think all this shows is that while under the ordinary course of things when we say "know" we don't particularly care whether somebody's belief is justified, that's because most of the time we expect that it is. Whenever we have reason to suspect that's not the case, however, we become more circumspect about what it means to know something. Whether it's the case of someone who is drunk, or a hypochondriac, or a pathological liar, we are rightly hesitant to ascribe knowledge to the fool who always cries that it's noon, just because at the moment it does happen to be noon.
Posted by joshua at July 17, 2003 08:31 AM