There is some truth in that has a post on the Problem of Evil, in which he recounts an argument against it that a professor of his recounted that he thought was quite brilliant, but that left him uneasy (probably because the argument is really pretty bad). The argument (the prof couldn't remember who originated it) is that a perfect world is impossible, because you can always imagine a more perfect one, so asking why God can't create it is asking why God can't do a logical impossibility (along the lines of creating a stone so heavy he can't lift it).
The reason that this is rubbish as an answer to the Problem of Evil is that it changes the subject. The question of why isn't this a world without evil isn't the same as the question of why isn't this world perfect. For example:
When it was first built, the John Hancock building in Boston had a problem: due to the height and shape of the building, wind and vibration caused the huge 500-pound window-panes to pop out and plummet to the ground, where they would shatter, scattering shards of glass everywhere. Eventually so many windows has been covered with plywood that locals referred to it as "the world's tallest plywood skyscraper." After some years, and seven million dollars of replacement for the original glass and lead solder, the window problem was solved. Another three million was spent on mass dampers when it was discovered that the building was in danger of twisting itself apart, since its sway period was dangerously close to its tortion period, which made it bend in the middle instead of rock back and forth in the wind. Then came the re-inforcement of the base to keep it from being knocked over by the wind...
Imagine trying to use the prof's theodicy against someone wondering how come the Hancock was such a mess if it was designed by such a hot-shot architect (in ths case Henry Cobb of I.M. Pei & Assoc.)
Complainer: Why didn't the architects and engineers of the Hancock do a better job?
Apologist: No matter how good a building is, you can imagine a better one. So there's no such thing as a perfect building. What you're asking for is a logical impossibility.
C: No I'm not, I'm asking for a building that doesn't send 500 pound slabs of glass hurtling towards the pavement like bombs!
A: If it wasn't that, it would be something else; buildings necessarily fall short of perfection.
C: It doesn't have to be perfect, but it shouldn't be a menace! A building that doesn't fold up or keel over in the wind isn't a logical impossibility.
I.e., one might say that if there wasn't a Problem of Evil, or a Problem of Pain, then it would be something else (the Problem of Insufficient Parking, or something), but that doesn't even begin to show that the Problem of Evil need not be answered on its own merits, any more than the Problem of Falling Windows doesn't need to be answered because of the Impossibility of a Perfect Building.
Posted by joshua at November 20, 2003 10:16 AMSo suppose God created a world that was just like this one, but with no falling windows. Then there'd be something else to complain about, always. Unless there's some point where you can say to God, "ok, a better world would be nice, but this one's good enough," the argument goes through.
I think your intention is to establish such a point, but to do so you have to assume something at least a little contentious (I, for example, contest it) -- that there is a difference between evil and lack of good. If this is true, then God could solve the problem of evil by reducing to zero the amount of evil, but not necessarily by creating any particular amount of good. Unfortunately for me, I find this idea problematic, for reasons that I won't get into right now. But if your view of moral value is essentially deontological, then this answer works.
Posted by: Jonathan at November 20, 2003 07:11 PMWell, yes, insofar as it is not merely good (as a matter of contingent consequences) but by right (as a matter of principle), that windows not fall out of buildings and buildings not blow over in the wind, then I suppose it's a deontological principle that I'm appealing to. If consequentialism can't resist this move, then so much the worse for consequentialism. It seems to me, though, that even a consequentialist might see that there's something loopy in the notion that if you had the power to bring about two world states, one with more utility (average, total, whatever) than the other you ought to bring about the better state unless you were omnipotent in which case because you can't bring about a perfect state you're not even required to bring about the better lesser state.
Posted by: Joshua at November 20, 2003 08:04 PMSo? Nobody said being God would be easy. Besides, is it really that obvious that the imperfections of the world are infinite beyond the power of omnipotence to repair? It seems to me that most Christian theists also believe in Heaven, which they don't seem to conceive of as being infinitely short of perfection.
And what if you're not omnipotent? Can't you also say that for any effort you expend to increase utility in the world, there's always something more that you could be doing, at least until you reach the ragged edge where spending any more would make you worse off than the next-worst person, so you might as well do nothing? Do consequentialists generally accept that as a sound argument?
Posted by: Joshua at November 21, 2003 02:52 PMDemandingness is a big issue for consequentialists, and there's a ton of literature on it. I'm not really comfortable giving a sociological answer to "do consequentialists generally accept the argument?". I know some who do, and some who don't. My view depends on the distinction between *morally right* and *permissible* or *praiseworthy*, which is really too subtle to get into in a blog comment. I'm working on a term paper that deals with this right now... if you're interested, email me in a couple weeks and I'll send you my detailed response.
Posted by: Jonathan at November 22, 2003 03:27 PM