Blogosophy

Paging Dr. Evil

In Fake Barn Country: Epistemologists Allan Hazlett offers some epistemological objections to the argument in Adam Elga's How to Defeat Dr. Evil with Self-Locating Belief
He summarizes the situation thus:

Recall Dr. Evil. He wants to attack Earth with his “laser,” but a terribly trustworthy group (the PDF) sends him a message informing him that they have constructed a duplicate of him. The duplicate (Dup) is in a realistic, but fake, version of Dr. Evil’s moon base, and the PDF is going to torture Dup if he presses the button to “fire the laser.” Dr. Evil wants very much to avoid torture, more than he wants to attack Earth. He believes what he reads in the PDF’s message – there is a duplicate of him, the duplicate will get tortured if he presses the button, and phenomenologically one can’t distinguish between being Dr. Evil and being Dup. What we want to know is: should Dr. Evil surrender (i.e. not press the button)?

Without going into Elga's indifference principle, or Allan's objection to it, I'd like to offer the following line of thought as to why Dr. Evil, even though he believes the PDF have constructed Dup, and wants very much to avoid torture, ought to be confident that he is Dr. Evil and not Dup. Ready? Here goes:

The PDF have no reason to try to stop Dup from pressing the button, and even if they did they would be in a position to make it manifest to Dup that he is completely in their power. The PDF are trying to persuade me not to press the button, and are not demonstrating their power over me. Thus, I am Dr. Evil, not Dup, so I am free to press the button.

Heavens Above

Has anyone noticed, or commented on, the fact that if the No Perfect World argument is sound, then Heaven is impossible? I suspect that philosophers who regard it as a logic puzzle don't care, but Christian apologists probably ought to. Yes, even an eternity of perfect bliss in communion with God can alway be improved upon. Perhaps by adding adequate parking...

Then a miracle occurs

Bad God, Bad God, No Biscuit

In Thoughts Arguments and Rants: The Problem of Evil hits the papers, Brian Weatherson notes that the recent devastation caused by the tsunami has brought a resurgence of public interest in the Problem of Evil. Without addressing his main point (Bishop Jensen's excuse), I'd like to say that from my perspective, both Brian's favorites aren't very good at all.

First, the modal realism solution of Donald Turner and Hud Hudson:

* There is a class of abstract possible worlds W. (I’m not going to say what abstract and concrete amount to in any of this - on this distinction see Gideon Rosen’s SEP entry.) In other words, weak modal realism is true.
* God cannot change any of those worlds without destroying it - what happens in a world is essential to its nature.
* What God can do is make any of them that He chooses concrete. Abstract possible worlds have no moral value, but concrete worlds do have value, or disvalue if they are bad, so this choice is morally loaded.
* God’s creation is timeless, so He can’t create one and then tinker with it. For each world He faces a take-it-or-leave-it choice.

...If all this is true, what should God do? Well, I think He should create all and only the worlds such that it is better that they exist than that they not exist. And that will include worlds, like this one, that are not perfect but that contain more goodness than suffering. So the existence of this world as concrete entity is compatible with God’s existence, and indeed His omnipotence and benevolence.

To which I say, more goodness than suffering might be satisfying to a particular kind of utilitarian, but isn't what I would call benevolent. The better exists than not exists line should be drawn elsewhere. I would claim that no benevolent entity would choose to create a situation in which there is pointless suffering. Given an infinite number of abstract possible worlds, it's anything but benevolent to choose to instantiate worlds in which there is any pointless suffering at all even if by some measures the total good is substantially more than the total evil. Unless you adopt a Panglossian view, our world is admitted to contain pointless suffering. I think Brian would point out that means I think that it would be better that our world not exist, and wonders whether even the most dedicated proponent of the Argument from Evil can sincerely hold that belief. Well, maybe. I prefer that this world exist, but I don't pretend to omnibenevolence. If I were standing outside of it all, faced with a big green "Create" button I think I would genuinely face a moral problem. Standing outside, a Nietzchean amor fati view might seem attractive, but consider: if pressing it meant I could have the life I currently do, I would be sorely tempted, but if I would be forced to live the life of a random sentient¹ being from a random time my sense is that it would be rational to be reluctant. Heck, if pressing it meant having to live Nietzche's life I would be terrified. And if that's the case, then I really doubt that pushing the button is a clearly benevolent act. And if I could push another button that instead would create this world minus any pointless suffering (say, one where the laws of nature were all the same, but by purest chance any suffering that would have no beneficial effect throughout the rest of time gets terminated by a freak quantum occurence), that would clearly be a more benevolent choice.

I've already dealt with the other one (no best possible world) before, although I don't think I convinced Jonathan. Basically, I just don't see that there's any bite to contending that if there's no best possible X, then complaints about a minimally decent X are ill-founded since there will always be something to complain about. No best possible world, so don't complain that our world has pointless suffering. We don't accept that argument anywhere else, I think. If the peasants weren't complaining about starvation, they'd be complaining about how their cheap food was making them fat², so the fact the king lets them starve says nothing about how benevolent he is?

¹ to the extent of being able to suffer, anyway.

² That people actually do this makes me boggle.